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Anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that the economy is an important determinant of 
crime (Box and Hales 1982; Gould et al. 2002). In economic models of crime such as Becker’s 
(1968), a declining economy provides higher incentives for individuals to commit offenses. This 
prediction is likely to be more applicable to crimes with direct financial motivates, such as thefts, 
but less important for non-economic-related crimes (such as homicides and sexual offences) that 
are affected by a completely different set of determinants (Machin and Meghir 2004; Edmark, 
2005). As Mustard (2010) maintains, the empirical results fail to support consistent evidence in 
favour of the link between slowdowns and illegality. Among the possible reasons, the author 
highlights that countervailing forces could play a role: a shrinking economy might provide 
greater incentives for people to substitute the legal labor market with the illegal one, but might 
also imply that fewer resources are available for criminals to steal. Furthermore, the number of 
victimless crimes, such as drug dealing or gambling, tends to be a function of customer demand, 
which may well decrease during economic downturns (Freeman, 1999). However, the failure 
could be also related to pitfalls in empirical strategies. Only recently the empirical literature has 
started to tackle seriously the threats to identification that might arise. Omitted variables, reverse 
causation and measurement issues can be jointly tackled with IV strategies (Mehlum et al. 2006; 
and Gould et al. 2002). 
This paper assesses the causal impact of local economic downturns on variations in criminal 
activity. It focuses on Italy and concentrates on recent developments – namely, an economic 
crisis of unprecedented gravity since the Great Depression. Since the international crisis in Italy 
has brought about not only cross-time volatility, but also high levels of sectoral and geographical 
variability in economic activity, there is enough variation across local areas to identify the effect 
of the crisis on crime, isolating it from many other confounding factors.1 
 
2. Data and Method 
We address the impact of the economy on crime using the following specification: 
 
(1) CRIMEi,t = D  +  β ECONACTi,t-1 +6n (Gn Xi,t) +Ji+ρt + εi,t 
 
                                                 
1 For instance, a Collective Clemency Bill passed by the Italian Parliament in July 2006, which led to the early release 
of a large share of detainees.  
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Where i indexes spatial units and t years; CRIME denotes the number of illegal acts of a 
given type (i.e., thefts) while ECONACT is a proxy of local (private) economic activity in the 
area.2 Our analysis is based on a panel (2004-2011) with area (Ji) and time (ρt) fixed effects. 
Importantly, area fixed effects absorb the effect of all time-invariant local factors, including the 
size of the local areas. Xi,t indicates time-varying covariates at the chosen level of geographic 
aggregation. As for the latter, we include the total number of native and foreigner population. 
Moreover, we allow each control to have a different confounding impact on crime.3 
Identification comes from within-area overtime lagged correlation between economic conditions 
and crime. All the variables we use are taken in logs.4 Thus, the coefficient β approximates the 
elasticity of crime to the economic conditions in the preceding year5 
Identification challenges are tackled by adopting as instrument, the “shift-share” estimation 
of economic activity, which is computed as the sum of the contemporaneous nationwide 
employment variation by sector, weighted by the sector share in local employment in 2001: 
 
(2) INSTi,t-1 = Σk  (empn,k,t-1* sharei, k, T / emp n,k,t-2) 
 
Where j refers to local areas, t to year, T to the year 2001, n to the nationwide value, and k to 
sectors. 
The instrumental variable is a derivation of the shift-share approach introduced by Bartik 
(1991) and Blanchard and Katz (1992), and used extensively by Moretti (2010), Gould et al. 
(2002) and Fougere et al. (2009). The validity of the instrument relies on the fact that national 
shocks to individual sectors impact the local economies proportionally to the employment shares 
of those sectors in total employment. The crucial assumption for the validity of the exclusion 
restriction is that both the sectoral composition of the local economy in year 2001 and the 
nationwide shocks do not have any independent effect on the dependent variable.  
Two other aspects need deeper consideration. Firstly, the analysis employs a more suitable 
spatial classification than the bulk of the previous work on the subject. The geographic units of 
reference are the local labor markets (LLMs), which are functional areas defined as groups of 
                                                 
2 Since we include time dummies, the measure of economic activities is left in nominal terms. Only the count of 
criminal acts are available in the source data, although the value would provide more relevant information.  
3 This is probably an unnecessary precaution, since previous literature suggests that there is no causal impact of the 
growth of non-native population on crime (see Bianchi et al., 2012). 
4 For crime events, we add one to all observations in order to keep zeros in the sample. 
5 We lag both the instrument and the endogenous independent regressor to further strengthen the exogeneity of our 
instrument, though our results are consistent in terms of sign and statistical power when fitting concomitant 
explanatory variable and instrument. 
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municipalities interconnected by large commuting flows.6 Data at the local level delivers 
substantial benefits in the empirical strategy, as “national or state-level data mask much of the 
important variation that is needed to identify causation” (Mustard, 2010). Using areas defined on 
the basis of labor market interactions represents an appropriate methodology for answering the 
research question, i.e. the degree to which criminal activities substitute legal labor market 
opportunities. Secondly, the study takes advantage of a unique dataset on criminal acts. The 
dataset employed is the Investigation System (IS), available at the municipality-level for the years 
2004-2011 and including 34 sub-categories of crime. This dataset collects information on victim 
reports gathered during day-by-day investigation s into criminal activity by police departments.7 
Therefore, crime data are less biased by the underreporting issue that hinders the empirical 
analysis of crime. Along with the LLM and year fixed effects present in all our specifications8, the 
exhaustiveness of the data guarantees that there is no systematic measurement error in the 
dependent variables. 
The measure adopted to assess the local state of the economy is the sum of the sales 
generated by all company plants (belonging to private firms) located in the LLM. The variable is 
obtained from the commercial archive Cerved, containing detailed balance sheet information on 
all Italian corporations.  We use Cerved data because labor surveys are not reliable at the LLM 
level.9 Compared to labor force survey data, balance sheet data are less informative with reference 
to the labor status of the residing population. However, balance sheets are more informative with 
respect to labor market deterioration that does not lead to unemployment (i.e. resulting only in 
wage losses due to reduced working hours).10 Moreover, the standard unemployment rate fails to 
consider non-participation issues (Bank of Italy, 2010).11  
                                                 
6 Local labor markets are defined by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat, 1997). They are aggregations of 
two or more neighbouring municipalities based on daily commuting flows from place of residence to place of work 
as recorded in the 2001 Population Census. Local labor markets are thus largely ”self-contained”: within a given 
unit, both the share of working residents working locally and the share of employees residing locally must be at least 
75%.  
7 IS data are confidential. They were made available to the staff of the Bank of Italy within a joint Bank of Italy-
Ministry of Interior project on crime and the economy. 
8 The LLM and year fixed effects controls absorb the local and temporal component of underreporting. For further 
information see: Bianchi et al., 2012) 
9 Labor force survey (LFS) data released at LLM level present large standard errors due to the small sample size of 
the underlying surveyed population. Furthermore, the LFS in Italy is stratified at regional level; LLM are much 
smaller than regions, on average, and can cross regional borders. These factors add further noise. 
10 This may be particularly important in Italy, where the network of “family insurance” often replaces a formal 
system of unemployment benefits (Saraceno, 1994). As a consequence, the shrinking of a single wage may have 
major repercussions on the well-being of several related individuals. 
11 Even though we consider firm data, the economic mechanism behind our results is essentially a labor market one. 
In the working paper draft of our study (see: https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/temi-
discussione/2013/2013-0925/index.html?com.dotmarketing.htmlpage.language=1) we provide additional evidence 
in this regard, showing that in those LLMs where labor market channels slowed down the impact of the recession 
(because of  the availability of wage supplementary schemes and/or pro-worker contractual arrangements) the 
estimated impact on crime is lower. 
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3. Empirical results 
Tables 1 presents the results obtained by using the number of different types of crime at LLM 
level reported in the IS as dependent variables.12 In column 1, we consider theft as a dependent 
variable. The OLS estimates suggest a positive, but statistically insignificant, correlation between 
the local economic downturn and economic-related crimes. In column 2, instrumental variable 
estimates reveal that an increase in economic activity reduces the number of thefts in the LLM, 
i.e. the impact of the economic downturn on thefts is positive.13 The magnitude of the effect is 
substantial: a 1% decrease in economic activity is linked to an increase of about 0.45% in thefts. 
The estimated elasticity implies a sizable impact on the different percentile of the distribution. 
For example, it suggests that moving from the LLM at the 75th percentile of the distribution of 
the variation in economic conditions in year 2009 to the LLM at the 25th percentile leads to an 
increase in stealing by around 7.65%.14 The F-test of the null hypothesis on the excluded 
instrument in the first stage of our IV estimate is equal to 16.92, thus validating the strength of 
the instrument.  
Columns 3-4 show the relationship between robberies and economic downturn. Crimes 
involving robbery represent a poor alternative for those who experience economic difficulties. 
Legally, robberies are identified as offenses for which goods are taken away from the victims by a 
physical act of violence, involving weapons in most cases. Compared to thefts, robberies require 
more crime-specific human and physical capital. Therefore, they are less appropriate than thefts 
as short-run criminal alternatives for those who act out of necessity. As reported in column 4, 
the impact of a local economic downturn on the number of robberies is positive but 
insignificant. While the sign suggests the possibility fora correlation between disadvantaged local 
economic conditions and robberies, the lack of significance in the estimated coefficient implies 
that this type of crime is less suitable for “occasional” criminals acting out of necessity. 
Columns 5-6 provide the results for murders. This experiment was intended to corroborate 
previous findings. First, murders are arguably weakly dependent on short-term changes in 
economic conditions, largely owing to the multiple factors influencing this criminal act; second, 
they are generally associated with psychological characteristics and skills (e.g. using a weapon) 
                                                 
12 We also run regressions using a slightly different specification for the dependent variables. We take the local 
number of crimes divided by the population (at the same time, we do not include population measures on the LHS). 
The results of these experiments, not reported but available from the authors, are very similar to those illustrated 
below. 
13 IV estimates are consistent when considering alternative approaches for the construction of the instrument, as for 
example when using the natural log of the variation or the first difference of the natural log (available upon request). 
14 Between 2008 and 2009, the economic activity of the LLM at the 25th percentile shrunk by 20%, while those of 
the LLM at the 75th percentile contracted by 3%. The difference between the two growth rates is therefore 17%.  
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which are unlikely to change in the short-term. Therefore, if economic activity was found to be 
correlated to homicides where no relationship is expected, it would indicate that the model failed 
to account for other confounding effects (for instance, a surge in crime due to cultural factors 
unrelated to the concomitant downturn). This does not appear to be the case as the results from 
Column 5-6 indicate that the economic downturn does not affect the level of homicides. 
Finally, in columns 7-8 we investigate whether number of drug-related crimes are influenced 
by the economic crisis. As emphasized by Freeman (1999), following market principles, if one 
assumes as constant the risk associated with drug-related activity, the expected return from 
engaging in illicit activity will be higher in more prosperous areas.  Result of our estimates 
support this mechanism in the Italian case. Specifically, we find that drug-related crimes 
experienced a sudden drop during the economic crisis, with a decrease of 1% in economic 
activity associated with a high level of elasticity (-1.2%) in drug crimes. 
 
4. Conclusions 
As featured in the Handbook on the Economics of Crime (Benson and Zimmerman, 2010), there 
is a gap between the theoretical claim that economic conditions have an impact on crime and the 
supporting empirical evidence. By exploiting the severe slump of 2007-2011 and making use of a 
number of technical advancements (i.e. highly-disaggregated spatial units, more reliable data on 
crime, an identification strategy that is suited to deal with threats to causality) this paper helps fill 
that lacuna.15 
This article finds that in Italy’s local labor markets thefts significantly increased as an effect 
of the downturn. Compared to offences that are easy-to-commit by those less equipped with 
criminal expertise, economic-related offences that require some crime-specific human and 
physical capital, such as robberies, are not affected by the crises. Non-economic crimes, such as 
murders are not influenced by economic fluctuations. Additionally, our analysis confirms a 
positive correlation between drug-related crimes and economic activity.  
The idea that economic slumps jeopardise the safety of a population is of growing concern 
to governing authorities.  Our estimates therefore contribute to informing the fight against 
crime. Overall, the findings suggest that national and local authorities should add criminality to 
the long list of social problems that require attention during an economic crisis. However, they 
also offer a more nuanced insight into the dynamics of economic-related crime by highlighting 
how crisis-related surges in criminal offenses are limited to unskilled criminal activities, i.e. thefts. 
                                                 
15 Interestingly, previous empirical studies for Italy focusing on different spatial units, data, and time periods, 
produce rather different results (e.g. Buonanno, 2006). 
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This suggests that policy responses stand a higher chance of success if they are tailored to the 
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Table 1. The effect of economic activity on crimes, OLS and second-stage IV 
 



















   
  
    
ECONACT (lag) 0.051 -0.456** 0.023 -0.594 -0.010 0.199 0.056 1.236** 
 
(0.060) (0.225) (0.056) (0.414) (0.028) (0.424) (0.059) (0.534) 
Native (ln) 0.161*** 0.279*** 0.134** 0.278** 0.034 -0.015 -0.039 -0.315** 
 
(0.040) (0.075) (0.056) (0.118) (0.053) (0.115) (0.064) (0.148) 
Foreigners (ln) 0.006 -0.260* -0.079 -0.402 0.021 0.131 0.035 0.653* 
 
(0.143) (0.140) (0.106) (0.253) (0.066) (0.234) (0.114) (0.394) 
LLM FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,732 4,732 4,732 4,732 4,732 4,732 4,732 4,732 
Number of LLM 683 683 683 683 683 683 683 683 
First-stage 
INST (lag)  4.868***  4.868***  4.868***  4.868*** 
  (1.173)  (1.173)  (1.173)  (1.173) 
F-statistic excl. IV  16.92  16.92  16.92  16.92 
Notes: The unit of observation is the Local Labor Market (LLM). All variable are in logs. Robust standard errors clustered at LLM level in parenthesis. The F-statistics reported 
in the First-stage results is the outcome of a test of significance of the excluded instrument. The first-stage regressions also include the same set of controls and fixed effects 
included in the main specifications. ***significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%.  
Source: Authors’ elaborations on ISTAT, CERVED, and IS database 
 
